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This dissertation examines the relationship between dividend payment and timing and amount 
decision of share repurchase, in the Japanese equity market. After “shouhou kaisei” (review of 
Commercial Law) in September 2003 that eased restrictions on share repurchase, the share 
repurchases have experienced a boom. And this trend further speeded up after 2013 when JPX was 
established. Since this trend is increasing continuously in Japan, it is necessary to understand how the 
timing and amount of share repurchase are decided. However, most of researches on Japanese market 
are only focusing on how share repurchase amount is impacted by dividend payment, the time period 
of research is also before the 2008 global financial crisis. Therefore, it is worthwhile to look into 
whether timing of share repurchase is impacted by dividend payment, also, whether there is any 




My research has two main objectives. First objective is to analyze how share repurchase’s timing 
is impacted by historical dividend payment situation. I obtain financial data and share repurchase data 
from Astra Manager database and examine 13,992 firm-year observations. Second objective is to 
analyze how share repurchase’s amount is impacted by dividend forecast error. I acquire data from 
same database and examine 812 companies through period from year 2001 to 2018.  
In terms of first objective, results show when companies paid more of profit out as dividend in 
previous year, or their dividend payout ratio is higher than industry average, they are more likely to 
conduct share repurchase. But the departure of their dividend payout ratio from past 5 year’s average 
does not have significant impact on timing of share repurchase. In terms of second objective, I find 
that companies dividend forecast error has no statistically significant impact on the amount of share 
repurchase, which is consistent with previous literature finds in Japanese market, that there is an 
independent relationship between dividend and share repurchase. And coefficient of ROA, ratio of 
interest-bearing debt, shareholding of foreign investors become significant after adding financial 
characteristics and year dummies into the model. This is consistent with previous literature, that 
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Recent years, shares repurchase has become more and more popular in developed capital markets 
such as US and Japan. In US, the popularity of share repurchase started from 1980. Because of the 
prevailing of hostile takeover that time, share repurchase was regarded as an effective defense. 
(Sasaki, Hanaeda(2010) ) Then, from the introduction of SEC 10b-18 Repurchase Agreement in 1982, 
share repurchase was not regarded as share price manipulation any longer, and the conduction of 
repurchase also became easier. From then, share repurchase’s adoption gradually started to catch up 
with dividend payment. 
Chart 1 shows the change of S&P 500 companies’ share repurchase amount. Due to the global 
financial crisis, share repurchase had experienced a drastical decrease. But besides this, the total 
amount of share repurchases in US have been generally increasing over decades. Its total amount has 
just reached to a new peak as $645.8 billion in the year ending June 2018. 























































Japan also follows this trend generally and has a yearly-increasing repurchase amount as far as 
from 2001, except a brief drop in the amount in 2008 -2010, during the period of global financial 
crisis. 
In Japan, from the “shouhou kaisei” (review of Commercial Law) in October 2001, companies 
were permitted to buy back their own shares and keep them as treasury stock, as long as they are 
permitted by shareholder meeting. And after a second “shouhou kaisei” in September 2003, without 
shareholder meeting, board itself could make the share repurchase decision. From that time, the 
increase trend in share repurchase became very significant. Although this trend was also impeded by 
2008 financial crisis, but it regained momentum very quickly after the crisis, and kept increasing until 
now. 
(Source: Credit Suisse, Barclays, Nomura Securities, JPX, AllianceBernstein) 
The increase of share repurchases, in terms both of amounts and frequency, is significantly 
speeded up from year 2013. One of reasons behind it is believed to be related with the establishment 
of JPX 400. Because when JPX 400 pick its component stocks, ROE is a key criterion, and 
conducting share repurchase is a relatively easy way to increase ROE. Therefore, the motivation of 
being picked by JPX 400, may have impacts on the increasing attention paid on share repurchase. 











































































reorganizing shareholding structures are believed as important reasons. Because of these reasons, 
while dividends only had an average annual growth of 10% from 2009 to 2018, share repurchasing 
expenditure grew at an average annual growth rate of 29% during this period. 
As a consequence of this, share repurchase as a percentage of total profit return amount came from 
15% in 2009 to a 33% in 2018. Although this ratio is still relatively low compared to US’s over 60% 
ratio, the fact that share repurchase has become more and more popular than dividends cannot be 
denied. And if this trend continues, share repurchase will soon become a main method to return cash 
than dividend. 
So, the what factors influence companies’ decision on the timing and size of share repurchase? 
This is a very interesting topic to research. Figuring out these factors may help us have a better 
understanding of reasons behind share repurchase boom. Also, companies can have a better reason 
when they are facing the choice between share repurchase and dividend in the future. 
This dissertation is related to the work of Grullon and Michaely (2002), who smartly incorporated 
Lintner’s dividend model (1956) to generate dividend forecast for every individual company in US. 
With forecast and actual dividend, they researched the relation between repurchase amount and 
dividend forecast error, concluded there was a substitutional relation between dividend forecast error 
and repurchase amount. Yamaguchi (2007) followed Grullon and Michaely (2002) and did the similar 
empirical analysis on Japanese companies from TSE Section I and II during period of 1992 to 2005. 
He found that there was a complementary relation between dividend forecast error and share 
repurchase amount, also found this relation disappeared after taking companies’ financial 
characteristics into analysis. In my dissertation, besides checking how repurchase’s amount is 
impacted, I also want to check possible factors impacting share repurchase’s timing, and then to check 
are there any changes in Japan after financial crisis. 
To test factors impacting repurchase timing, Logit model will be used to test the relationship 
between whether a share repurchase is conducted and company’s historical dividend payout situation, 
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including last year’s dividend payout ratio (DPR), DPR’s departure from last 5 years’ average and 
DPR’s departure from the industry average.  
To test factors impacting repurchase amount, I followed Grullon and Michaely (2002) and 
Yamaguchi (2007), used Lintner’s model to generate forecast error, and check the relation between 
forecast error and company’s share repurchase amount. 
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: Section 2 will reference the relevant literature 
which enlighten and help me for this research. Section 3 will talk about the data, its collection process, 
descriptive statistics and the methodology. Section 4 will report the results of each analysis, and I will 
try to give some explanations and also reference back to previous literature. And section 5 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEWS 
Dividend payout and share repurchase are two distinct method to return cash to shareholders. They 
have been discussed ever since 1980s. Many important researches are focused on the relationship 
between these two methods. In order to figure out reasons behind companies’ decision, several 
theories had been established, and among them the most important ones are Signaling Model and 
Agency Model. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961), Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) implied that profit 
payout (either in form of dividends or repurchases) could be used to send signal of stock price 
undervaluation to the market. Companies distinguish themselves as high-quality companies by paying 
high dividends, which is hard or impossible to be imitated by low-quality companies. For low-quality 
companies, they have to abandon good investing opportunities if they want to pay the same high-level 
dividend. In their theory, dividends and share repurchase were regarded interchangeable and make no 
difference in sending signal. 
However, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) concluded that, management only uses dividends, 
but not the share repurchase, to signal the firm's quality. According to their theory, because 
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institutional investors are relatively less taxed than individual investors, dividends will induce 
“ownership clientele” effects. Firms paying dividends will attract relatively more institutional 
investors, which have a relative advantage in distinguishing themselves as high-quality firms and 
showing that they are now under good management.  
Then, Guay and Harford (2000), Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) made the point that, 
not only the action of paying dividend itself, but preventing dividends payout from decreasing can 
also send good signals to market. They believe market will be convinced that company’s operation is 
stable, a health profit growth can be expected. 
Besides the signaling model, Easterbrook (1984) provided the agency model. In his model, after 
increasing dividend payout, company actually decreases its cash. Under this situation, if it still wants 
to proceed with its planned investments, it has to go to capital market for financing. This will increase 
the monitoring from its investor and potential ones, thus mitigate the agency problems. Jensen (1986) 
also imply that paying dividends will decrease companies’ free cash flow and prevent management 
from taking value-destructive takeovers. 
The same theory is also validated in Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000). They suggested 
that dividends are used by firms with higher "permanent" operating cash flows, while repurchases are 
used by firms with higher "temporary", non-operating cash flows. The later ones’ cash flows and 
profit redistribution are also more volatile. They conclude, repurchase is used as an alternative for 
dividends by those “less stable” companies. In other words, share repurchase is used to pay 
extraordinary transitory earnings out and dividend is used to pay permanent earnings out. 
In terms of investigating the extent of substitutability of dividend payout and share repurchases, 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) examined the relation between the disappearance of special 
dividends and the appearance of repurchase programs. They do not find evidence that share 
repurchase programs have replaced special dividends. Therefore, there is no evidence supporting that 
substitutional relation exists between dividends and share repurchase.  
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Grullon and Michaely (2002) use Linter Model to generate expected dividend payout amount and 
compare these expected dividend payout amounts with actual ones. Then they find that dividend 
forecast errors (expected - actual) are negatively related with share repurchase amounts. Their 
research provides evidence that companies have been substituting share repurchases for dividends. 
Yamaguchi (2007) followed Grullon and Michaely (2002) and did the similar empirical analysis 
on Japanese companies, which are from TSE Section I and II during period of 1992 to 2005. He finds 
that in Japan market, there is a complementary relation between dividends and share repurchase. But 
this complementary relation disappears when company’s financial characterics (such ROE, Ratio of 
non-operating income) are introduced as control variables.  
3. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. DATA AND SAMPLE 
So, my dissertation follows Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Yamaguchi (2007)’s researches. My 
first research objective is to examine whether there is relation between the timing of company’s share 
repurchase and its history dividends payout situation. Then I will also test, whether the amount of 
share repurchase of a specific company is impacted by dividend’s forecast error. This error is 
generated by using the method in Grullon and Michaely (2002). Therefore, this dissertation mainly 
tests following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher previous year’s dividend payout ratio (DPR), and a bigger DPR’s 
departure from its last 5 year’s average and industry average will impact this year’s share repurchase 
tendency negatively. 
Hypothesis 2: In short-term (within one financial year), company’s dividend forecast error (actual 
minus expected) is related with company’s share repurchase amount negatively 
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The year in the hypothesis is the financial year. Because most of Japanese companies usually set 
the end of financial year in April or May, I use the 31st May as the end of every financial year to 
classify which year the share repurchase belongs to. 
In order to test first hypothesis, I made a sample of 16,532 firm-year observations from 2009-2017 
at first. This period is chosen because this is the latest period when I started my research. All sample 
companies are coming from Tokyo Stock Exchange Section I, for companies here are relatively more 
mature and bigger, their investment is more dispersed, and they are also invested by more institutional 
investors and have better liquidity. These characteristics mean they are under more strict scrutiny and 
their financial characteristics are more stable. Statistically, the absolute number of TSE I companies is 
also enough to avoid sampling bias.  
Then financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies are excluded from sample, 
because their capital structure and financing pattern are quite different from normal companies. This 
leaves 15,092 firm-year observations. Also, in order to reduce the effect of extreme values, all 
observations with dividend payout ratio higher than 300% are also eliminated. This left 14,229 
observations. In the end, after eliminating observations with missing or error data, the total sample 
size is narrowed down to 13,912. 
To test second hypothesis, Lintner model is used to generate company’s expect dividend payout. 
To do this, company’s previous year’s dividend payment and present year’s earning data and dividend 
payment are needed to estimate company-specific parameters. In order to make the estimation as 
accurate as possible, a 14-year period from 2001 to 2014 has been chosen, so the sample size is big 
enough to avoid sampling bias. And then the latest 2015-2018 period is picked to test relation between 
forecast error and share repurchase amount. 
Because in this test, expect dividend is estimated for every specific company, every tested 
company has to be existing during the whole period during 2001 to 2018. I cross check the TSE I’s 
company list in 2001 and 2018, 812 non-financial companies keep existing during the whole period. 
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Therefore, 14,616 firm-year observations in total are available. And among them, 11,368 observations 
are used to estimate the company-specific parameters, and the left 3,248 firm-year observations are 
used to generate forecast errors and conducting the test. 
3.2. REGRESSION MODEL 
The empirical analysis in my dissertation is based on the following two models. The first one is 
the Logit Model, which is used to test my first hypothesis. The second model is Lintner Model, I use it 
to test the second hypothesis. 
3.2.1. Logit Model 
In order to test whether companies’ shares repurchase timing are impacted by its historical 
dividend payout situation, logit model is used: 
REPi,t+1 = β1DepINDi,t + β2Dep5yi,t + β3PORi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5LnTAi,t + β6SHFi,t + β7IBDEBi,t 
+ β8ROEi,t + β9DeltaMVi,t + β10D2016 + β11D2015 + β12D2014 + β13D2013 + β14D2012 + 
β15D2011 + β16D2010 + β17D2009 + μi 
 
REPi,t+1 = Whether company i’s has conducted share repurchase in the year t+1, 1 if company has 
conducted repurchase and 0 for otherwise 
DepINDi,t = Company i’s dividend payout ratio departed from its industry’s average in the year t  
Dep5yi,t = Company i’s dividend payout ratio departed from last 5 years’ average in the year t 
PORi,t = Company i’s payout ratio in the year t 
ROAi,t = Company i’s return of asset in the year t 
LnTAi,t= Logarithm of company i’s total asset in the year t 
SHFi,t= Company i’s shareholding of foreign investors in the year t 
IBDEBi,t = Company i’s ratio of interest-bearing debt in the year t 
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ROEi,t = Company i’s return of equity in the year t 
DeltaMVi,t = Company i’s market value’s change from year t-1 to year t 
Dyear = Dummy variables for year, 1 if the financial data is for that specific year and 0 otherwise 
3.2.1.1 Control Variables 
Besides historical dividend behavior, company’s repurchase activities may also be impacted by 
other factors, especially companies’ financial characteristics. Therefore, in addition to POR, Dep5y 
and DepIND, I also introduce a group of control variables into the regression model to capture the 
influences from companies’ financial characteristics. Most of my control variables are widely used in 
analysis for companies’ financing activities. The rationale behind my choose is discussed in 
followings. 
ROA 
According to free-cashflow theory, companies with higher profitability tends to have richer free 
cashflow. Shareholders will have stronger incentives to push companies to conduct dividend payout or 
share repurchases to avoid outflow of cash. Also, companies with high profitability will have more 
retained earnings, which will make conducting dividend payout and share repurchases easier. So, both 
these two theories suggest that ROA will be positively related with share repurchases. 
Total Asset (Logarithm of total asset) 
Generally, bigger size companies have easier access to finance, so their dependence on retained 
earnings are smaller, then they will be more likely to conduct dividend payout or share repurchases. 
Also, bigger companies tend to have more dispersed asset, thus a lower bankruptcy probability, which 
leads to a positive impact on dividend payout or share repurchase activities. Therefore, its coefficient 
is also expected to be positive. 
Shareholding of Foreign Investors 
According to Tsubouchi Shinji (2014), with the increase of share of foreign investor, companies 
will put shareholder’s interests on higher priority. Return to shareholders will be bigger and more 
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frequent. This suggests shareholding of foreign investors will be positively related with share 
repurchases. 
Ratio of Interest-bearing Debt 
According to pecking order theory, companies with higher interest-bearing debt will have stronger 
incentive to reserve profit, so dividends payout or share repurchases will be impacted negatively. Plus, 
ratio of interest-bearing debt can also be taken as a proxy for company’s debt repayment ability. By 
bankruptcy cost theory, companies with higher ratio of interest-bearing debt will then have weaker 
incentive to conduct dividends or repurchases. Also, by considering free-cashflow theory, high 
interest payment will decrease company’s free cashflow and then impact profit return activity 
negatively. All these three theories suggest this ratio will be negatively related with share repurchases. 
ROE 
According to signaling theory, companies with high ROE companies have stronger motivation to 
conduct repurchase, which can distinguish themselves as high-quality companies. Higher ROE also 
means high profitability, which will bring more free-cashflow. Therefore, a positive relation between 
ROE and share repurchase is suggested. 
Change of Market Value 
According to signaling theory, when companies’ stock performs not well, companies have 
incentives to send signal of undervalue to the market by announcing and carrying out share 
repurchases. So, I add this control variable to capture the change of market value during the financial 
year before the year share repurchase was conducted. Its coefficient is expected to be positive. 
Dummy variable for years 
I also add the dummy variables for year in order to take possible influential and important issues 
into consideration (such as Ito Review in 2014). Some policies or events are assumed to have great 




3.2.2. Lintner Model 
To investigate the relation between dividend and share repurchase on a firm level, I followed the 
method used by Grullon and Michaely (2002). First, Lintner model is used to generate company’s 
expected dividend amount based on last year’s dividend amount and this year’s earnings. After an 
investigation on company’s dividend policy, Lintner (1956) brought a model to describe how 
companies adjust their dividend target according to earnings and historical dividend amounts. That is: 
 
DIVi,t -DIVi,t-1 = ai + biEARNi,t + ciDIVi,t-1+ ui,t 
 
In the model, DIVi,t is  company i’s dividend per share in the period t, and EARNi,t is company i’s 
earning per share in the period t. This model implies that company change its dividend payment, 
according to last year’s dividend payment and this year’s earning. By using this model, the expected 
dividend for specific company based on its historical dividend payout can be estimated, and whether 
its actual dividend payout is over or under its forecasted ones (error) can also be measured. Therefore, 
if companies substituted repurchases for dividends, a negative correlation between forecast error 
(actual minus expected) and repurchase amount can be expected. Also, a positive or zero correlation 
also means there is a complementary or independent relationship between dividends and share 
repurchases. 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) used company data from 1973 to 1983 to estimate the parameters, 
after degree of freedom correction, the R2 in their results is 45.7%. I used period from 2001-2014 as 
the pre-forecast period to estimate the parameters of Lintner’s (1956) model. The R2 in this 
dissertation is 72.15%, means parameters in this dissertation has stronger explanation than Grullon 
and Michaely (2002). 




ERRi,t=[△DIVi,t - (β1,i + β2,iEARNi,t + β3,iDIVi,t-l)] / MVi,t-1  
 
where △DIVi,t is the actual dividend per share change from year t-1 to year t, EARNi,t is the 
earning per share in year t, DIVi,t-l is the dividend per share at year t - 1, and MVi,t-1 is the market 
value of equity in year t - 1. The coefficients β2,i and β3,i are the parameters of earnings and last year’s 
dividend respectively. They are measured company by company by using firm-year observations in 
the pre-forecast period. 
The average parameter estimation result is reported in Table 4. The average estimate for the 
coefficient of earnings is 0.0565, The average estimate for the coefficient of lagged dividends is 
0.6077 and the average adjusted R2 is 72.15 percent.  
And the share repurchase amount is represented by company’s total repurchase amount within 12 
months from 1st June to 31st May of next year. This period is chosen because most Japanese 
companies start their financial year around the period from April to June. 
After forecast error is defined, the following OLS model is used to test the relation between 
company’s share repurchase amount and forecast error: 
RAMVi,t = β1Erri,t + β2ROAi,t + β3ROEi,t + β4SHFi,t + β5IBDEBi,t + β6D2015 + β7D2016 + 
β8D2017 + μi 
 
RAMVi,t = Company i’s total share repurchase amount normalized by its previous year’s market 
value in the year t  
Erri,t = Company i’s dividend forecast error in the year t 
ROAi,t = Company i’s return of asset in the year t  
ROEi,t = Company i’s return of equity in the year t 
SHFi,t= Company i’s shareholding of foreign investors in the year t 
IBDEBi,t = Company i’s ratio of interest-bearing debt in the year t 
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Dyear = Dummy variables for year, 1 if the financial data is for that specific year and 0 otherwise 
 
3.2.2.1 Control variables 
I followed work of Grullon and Michaely (2002), and picked ROA, ROE, shareholding of foreign 
investors, ratio of interest-bearing debt as control variables. According to signaling theory, companies 
with high ROA, ROE may tend to pay more cash in the share repurchase. According to free cash flow 
theory, companies with lower ratio of interest-bearing debt tend to pay more cash in the share 
repurchase. Last but not least, according to agency theory, companies with high shareholding of 
foreign investors tend to pay more cash in the share repurchase. So, the coefficient of ROA, ROE and 
shareholding of foreign investors are expected to be positive and coefficient of ratio of interest-
bearing debt is expected to be negative. 
3.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In the first model, after taking steps to eliminate observations with missing data or errors, a sample 
containing 13,912 observations is reached. Key descriptive statistics regarding these companies’ 
financial characteristics are displayed in the table 1. 
Sample has been divided in two groups according to whether repurchases are carried out or not. 
As we can see from the table 1, in terms of POR, ROA, LnTA, SHF and ROE, companies in the 
repurchase group are consistently higher than those in the non-repurchase group through the whole 
period. In turn, repurchase group’s IBDEB is consistently lower than this of non-repurchase group. 
And there is not a consistent pattern for DeltaMV. 
For a higher POR of repurchase group, it shows that repurchase group has a consistency in 
returning profit. This is in accordance with findings of Miller and Rock (1985), they thought dividend 
and share repurchase are interchangeable in process of sending signal. This implies if companies pay 
more in dividend, they will be more likely to carry out share repurchase activity. Then, for higher 
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ROA and ROE, these usually mean company has a better profitability, or in other words, higher 
quality. The fact that repurchase group are higher in ROA and ROE can also be explained by 
signaling theory: those high-quality companies are more willing to distinguish themselves by 
conducting repurchases.  
And the fact that companies from repurchase group generally have a lower ratio of interest-
bearing debt and higher total asset is also consistent with Jensen (1986). These two factors will both 
lead companies to have more cash. This shows that companies with more free cash flow are more 
possible to conduct repurchase, because they want to decrease free cash flow to avoid agency 
problem. As for shareholding of foreign investors, according to Tsubouchi Shinji (2005), foreign 
shareholders are usually asking companies to return profit more and keep a better corporate 
governance. To meet these two needs, companies actually have more motivation to conduct share 
repurchase. 
A little counter-intuitive fact is that the change of market value before the repurchase has not a 
consistent pattern, suggesting that repurchase group companies have not always experienced stock 
price drop before they conduct a repurchase. This contradicts with signaling theory, that companies 
use share repurchase to pump up share prices. 
From 2009 to 2017, two group’s difference in POR, ROA, ROE and IBDEB are generally 
becoming smaller, and difference in SHF and LnTA are getting bigger. This trend may imply that the 
signaling effect by repurchase may have got weaker in implying company has a better profitability or 
a better debt ratio but have got stronger in implying company has a better corporate governance and a 
bigger asset size.  
In the second model, for parameter-generation observations in the period from 2001 to 2014, 
descriptive is in the table 2, and for the test period, which is from 2015 to 2018, key descriptive 
regarding observed companies’ profit return behavior is showed in the table 3 and 4. 
 
 15 
During the parameter-generation period, the average of 812 companies’ both EPS and DPS were 
experience a drastic increase before 2006 and became volatile but generally downward after 2008, the 
year of financial crisis. During the whole period, average dividend payout ratio excess 40% four 
times, and all of them happened after 2008, this suggests that companies in fact pays more of their 
profit out after the financial crisis, and it maybe an evidence of a generally enhancement of corporate 
governance after year 2008. 
And the standard deviation for percentage change of dividends per share is 0.21, standard 
deviation for percentage change of dividend payout ratio is 0.42. The dividend payout ratio is more 
stable than dividends per share, which may suggest that Japanese companies care stability of dividend 
per share more than stability of payout ratio. 
 
(Source: Astra Manager Database) 
For error-generation period from 2015 to 2018, companies are also divided into two subgroups 
according to whether they have carried out repurchase or not. Repurchase group has a higher total 
dividend payout ratio during the whole test period. This shows that companies which pay more 
dividends, instead of doing less repurchase, they are actually more likely to conduct repurchase in the 













obvious. Repurchase group not only has a little bit higher dividend payout ratio, it also has a much 
higher profit return ratio, by a 46% on average. This implies that the financial source used for 
repurchasing shares is not supposed to pay dividends at first. Companies are possibly using totally 
different financial source to pay dividends or to conduct share repurchase, without impacting 
dividends payout in any negative sense. 
And from dividend per share increase data, both groups all keep increasing their dividend per 
share after a decrease in 2015, and the increase speed is growing year by year from 2016, with 
repurchase group has an even slightly quicker speed. This may show that repurchase companies are 
not only willing to pay more than no repurchase companies, they are also willing to pay more than 
themselves. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, I interpret the regression results of the first model in table 6 and 7, and results of 
the second model in table 8. 
For firm-year observations in first model, a correlation analysis is performed in advance, to avoid 
multicollinearity problem. Results are showed in the table 5. Among three independent variables, 
POR and DepIND are strongly correlated. This result is consistent with Stephen, Gene and Michael 
(1993), they found that industry affiliation possesses significant explanatory power in modeling 
payout behavior at the individual firm level. 
Therefore, in order to avoid multicollinearity problem, four different models are used to run 
regression. Two correlated variables, POR and DepIND are presented separately to see their impacts 
on regression. Both of them is significantly positive at 1% level when they are included in the model 
separately.  
This means when companies pay more of profit as dividend in the last year, they are more 
probably to conduct share repurchase in this year. And when companies pay more dividends than 
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industry average, they are also more probably to conduct share repurchase. However, their payout 
ratio’s departure from its last 5 year’s average has no significant relation with future’s share 
repurchase under all four models. One possible explanation is that many Japanese companies get used 
to keep dividend per share relatively fixed and won’t take this as a reference when they make share 
repurchase decisions. 
Therefore, my empirical analysis shows a higher historical POR and an above-industry dividend 
payment will make the possibility of share repurchase bigger. One of possibilities of this is: these 
companies don’t need cash, and my model haven’t captured other important factors impacting this. 
For example, companies with high growth will usually pay less cash out, or companies with good 
investment opportunities will not keep too much cash. So, variables such as sales growth or Tobin’s Q 
may also have impact on company’s willingness to conduct repurchase. 
As for control variables, coefficient of ROE is positively significant at 1%. It is consistent with my 
expectation and can be explained with signaling theory: high quality companies have incentives to 
distinguish them from inferior ones by conducting share repurchase.  
Ratio of interest-bearing debt’s coefficient is negatively significant at 1%, and coefficient 
logarithm of total asset, its coefficient is also postively at 1%. This is also consistent with previous 
expectation, that companies with lower interest-bearing debt and bigger asset size have lower 
bankruptcy risk and more free cash flow, and they are more likely to conduct share repurchase. 
Coefficient of shareholding of foreign investors is also positively significant at 1%, this finding is 
consistent with Tsubouchi Shinji (2005). This reconfirms that return to shareholders will be bigger 
and more frequent with the increase of shareholding of foreign investors. 
Regression results of second hypothesis are reported in table 8. Before adding control variables 
and year dummies into the model, the coefficient of forecast error is not significant. This suggests that 
when companies decide the amount of repurchase, dividend forecast error has no significant impacts 
on their decision. This result partly contradicts with Yamaguchi (2007), his results show that in Japan, 
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before considering financial characteristics, companies’ dividend payment and share repurchase are 
complementary, but my results show they are independent. One of possible reasons maybe that after 
financial crisis, companies start to take more into consideration when they plan share repurchases. 
According to Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), the decision between dividend and 
share repurchase is impacted by companies’ financial characteristics, such as cash flow’s volatility. 
So, I also add control variables and year dummies to capture the impact from financial characteristics.  
From table 8 we can see, after adding control variables, coefficient of logarithm of total asset is 
positively significant at 1%, and coefficient of interest-bearing debt is negatively significant at 5%. 
This implies that in Japan, when companies making decision about repurchase amount, they based 
decisions on financial characteristics such as ROA and debt ratio, not on dividend payment. And this 
also shows in Japan dividend and share repurchase are two independent profit return methods. For 
total asset, this result is similar to Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), they also found that 
companies with bigger market value tend to pay more dividend than expectation. For interest-bearing 
debt ratio, the result can be explained by free-cash flow theory: more interest-bearing debt will lead to 
less free cash accumulated, and this will decrease companies’ motivation to pay more cash than 
necessary.  
5. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examines the relationship between companies’ dividend payout and repurchase 
shares, trying to figure out what factors impact companies’ decisions on both timing and amount of 
share repurchase. My research focuses on Japanese companies because there was a big boom in the 
total amount of dividends payout, share repurchase, and also in total cash return after the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Present researches are mainly focused on the period before 2008, but things may have 
changed fundamentally. Grullon and Michaely (2002), who examine a sample of US companies from 
1972 to 2000 and find companies finance their share repurchases with funds that otherwise would 
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have been used to increase dividends. Yamaguchi (2007) follows their work by testing samples from 
2002 to 2005 in Japan, finds there is a complementary relation between dividend and share 
repurchase, but the relation disappears after taking financial characteristics into consideration. My 
research motivation is to perform similar empirical test with latest samples and try to find out whether 
companies’ decision-making motivations have changed after the financial crisis, and also whether 
Japanese companies have similar preference like their US counterparts when financing their shares 
repurchase. 
I first conduct empirical analysis on a sample of 13,912 samples from companies from Tokyo 
Stock Exchange First Section from year 2009 to 2017. In my research, I find there was statistically 
significant relationships between “last year’s dividend payout ratio” “last year’s dividend payout 
ratio’s departure from same year’s industry average” and companies’ share repurchase decision, I also 
find parameters of control variables such as ROE, shareholding of foreign shareholders, logarithm of 
total asset, ratio of interest-bearing debt, are statistically significant. Possible reasons for this maybe 
that the timing choosing of companies’ share repurchase is driven by its capital restructure needs and 
cash management needs. Unlike US companies, Japanese companies are more reluctant to borrow 
debt and operate on high leverage, and they are more willing to retain more cash on their balance 
sheets. So, the large amount of cash on their balance sheet also provides a huge incentive to do 
repurchase. For Japanese companies, share repurchase is more like a financing tool than a way of 
returning profit. Another possible explanation could be that since I didn’t include variables such as 
sales growth or Tobin’s Q into my model, factors that beyond financial characteristics have not been 
captured. This may cause my model to reflect real situations insufficiently. This is also where I can 
improve my research in the future. 
Besides researching the possible timing-impacting factors, I further researched repurchases’ 
amount-impacting factors by using Lintner model in another the second test. By using Lintner Model, 
I calculated the difference (error) between companies’ expected dividends per share and realistic ones, 
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from year 2015 to 2018, and find that there is not statically significant relation between this error and 
companies’ share repurchase amount normalized by market value. This result differs from findings of 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) on US companies, that there is a substitutional relationship between 
dividend forecast error and repurchase amount. And this partly consist with Yamaguchi (2007), shows 
that in Japan, dividend payout and share repurchase are two independent profit return methods, and 
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Year Company Category DepIND Dep5y POR ROA LnTA SHF IBDEB ROE DeltaMV 
2009 
Without Repurchase -3.31 1.47 38.64 4.05 25.16 11.99 157.42 -3.38 -0.36 
With Repurchase 8.97 30.83 51.41 5.62 25.22 13.19 51.91 2.95 -0.32 
Diff -12.28 -29.36 -12.78 -1.57 -0.06 -1.2 105.51 -6.33 -0.03 
2010 
Without Repurchase -1.22 -43.32 40.57 3.52 25.16 12.42 187.97 -0.67 0.04 
With Repurchase 10.9 9.41 53.92 4.86 25.19 13 47.67 4.66 0.02 
Diff -12.12 -52.73 -13.35 -1.34 -0.03 -0.58 140.3 -5.33 0.02 
2011 
Without Repurchase 3.25 -31.99 45.03 5.05 25.18 12.92 92.75 4.34 -0.03 
With Repurchase 11.5 -143.05 54.2 5.82 25.17 13.79 49.59 6.15 -0.04 
Diff -8.26 111.06 -9.17 -0.77 0 -0.87 43.17 -1.81 0.02 
2012 
Without Repurchase -0.18 -78.03 41.66 4.87 25.19 12.9 79.11 3.98 -0.06 
With Repurchase 9.39 -53.38 52.52 6.29 25.26 14.14 47.53 6.7 -0.05 
Diff -9.57 -24.65 -10.86 -1.43 -0.07 -1.23 31.59 -2.72 -0.01 
2013 
Without Repurchase -1.37 -43 40.62 4.93 25.16 13.22 72.79 3.91 0.37 
With Repurchase 2.61 -212.78 45.4 5.99 25.27 15.61 49.65 6.8 0.37 
Diff -3.98 169.79 -4.78 -1.06 -0.11 -2.39 23.14 -2.88 0 
2014 
Without Repurchase -1.66 -41.69 40.39 5.36 25.1 14.54 66.52 6.62 0.08 
With Repurchase 2.89 -27.62 45.61 6.9 25.43 20.04 43.92 8.38 0.07 
Diff -4.56 -14.07 -5.22 -1.54 -0.34 -5.51 22.6 -1.76 0.01 
2015 
Without Repurchase -2.89 -38.84 39.24 5.64 25.08 15.29 63.94 6.61 0.27 
With Repurchase 4.6 -11.08 47.13 6.67 25.23 19.35 40.42 8.2 0.29 
Diff -7.5 -27.76 -7.89 -1.03 -0.15 -4.06 23.52 -1.59 -0.02 
2016 
Without Repurchase -2.81 -24.9 39.32 6.15 25 15.23 65.21 6.52 -0.13 
With Repurchase 3.77 -11.17 46.71 7.06 25.25 19.47 45.32 9.27 -0.12 
Diff -6.58 -13.73 -7.39 -0.91 -0.25 -4.24 19.89 -2.75 -0.01 
2017 
Without Repurchase -1.07 -10.14 41.1 6.21 24.95 15.62 68.96 7.17 0.2 
With Repurchase 3.33 -23.45 46.11 7.06 25.33 19.11 37.24 9.13 0.18 
Diff -4.4 13.31 -5.01 -0.86 -0.38 -3.49 31.72 -1.96 0.01 
Total 
Without Repurchase -1.27 -33.95 40.71 5.09 25.11 13.8 94.98 3.89 0.04 
With Repurchase 6.09 -43.96 48.88 6.37 25.26 16.96 45.04 7.33 0.06 



















from last year 
Percentage 
of change 
2001 93.81 28.51 - - 30.39% - - 
2002 82.09 28.52 -0.28 -1% 34.74% 4.35% 14.31% 
2003 135.64 32.58 5.91 21% 24.02% -10.72% -30.85% 
2004 97.53 33.93 2.07 6% 34.79% 10.77% 44.83% 
2005 274.29 67.88 11.79 35% 24.75% -10.04% -28.87% 
2006 534.13 103.95 16.1 24% 19.46% -5.28% -21.35% 
2007 338.24 68.48 -9.7 -9% 20.25% 0.78% 4.03% 
2008 494.78 110.77 9.86 14% 22.39% 2.14% 10.57% 
2009 250.62 102.16 -8.54 -8% 40.76% 18.38% 82.09% 
2010 208.89 84.46 -17.33 -17% 40.43% -0.33% -0.81% 
2011 312.93 91.53 7.07 8% 29.25% -11.18% -27.66% 
2012 319.23 89.93 -1.49 -2% 28.17% -1.08% -3.69% 
2013 114.41 64.56 -25.37 -28% 56.43% 28.26% 100.30% 
2014 87.42 37.54 -27.02 -42% 42.94% -13.48% -23.89% 
Table 2 
 
 Company Category 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Dividend per 
share increase 
from last year 
Companies with 
repurchase -14.82 2.45 7.77 13 
Companies without 
repurchase -6.42 3.53 4.27 12.78 





repurchase 35.91% 32.26% 33.55% 32.18% 
Companies without 
repurchase 30.87% 28.77% 30.35% 29.33% 





repurchase 72.66% 74.74% 78.93% 78.64% 
Companies without 
repurchase 30.87% 28.77% 30.35% 29.33% 








Coefficient for last 




earnings per share 
Intercept R squared 
0.6077 0.0565 8.8716 0.7215 
Table 4 
 
 DELTAMV DEP5Y DEPIND IBDEB LNTA POR ROA ROE SHF 
DELTAMV 1 -0.01 0 -0.1 -0.03 0 0.14 0.19 0.05 
DEP5Y -0.01 1 0.01 0 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0 
DEPIND 0 0.01 1 -0.02 0.08 0.99 -0.02 0.06 0.08 
IBDEB -0.1 0 -0.02 1 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.18 -0.02 
LNTA -0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.02 1 0.06 -0.12 -0.01 0.51 
POR 0 0.01 0.99 -0.03 0.06 1 -0.01 0.07 0.07 
ROA 0.14 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.12 -0.01 1 0.52 0.21 
ROE 0.19 0.01 0.06 -0.18 -0.01 0.07 0.52 1 0.11 
SHF 0.05 0 0.08 -0.02 0.51 0.07 0.21 0.11 1 
Table 5 
 




ROA 5.07 5.68 
Logrithnm of Total Asset 25.87 25.83 
Shareholding of Foreign Investors 20.07 20.5 
Ratio of Interest-baering Debt 72.87 53.79 




	 1 2 3 4 
POR 
0.03*** 0.00*** - - 
5.95 6.97 - - 
Dep5y 
0 0 0 0 
-1.14 -1.22 -1.23 -1.18 
DepIND 
-0.02*** - 0.00*** - 
-5.16 - 6.26 - 
ROA 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
1.43 1.71 1.68 1.17 
LnTA 
0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
5.67 5.36 5.34 5.63 
SHF 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
3.39 3.06 3.05 3.4 
ROE 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 




-0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 
-1.47 -1.28 -1.26 -1.36 
IBDEB 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
-9.19 -9.47 -9.57 -10.05 
D2009 
-0.60*** -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.58*** 
-5.12 -5.05 -5.03 -5 
D2010 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
-0.36 -0.34 -0.33 -0.25 
D2011 
-0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 
-0.86 -0.9 -0.89 -0.69 
D2012 
-0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 
-1.69 -1.68 -1.67 -1.62 
D2013 
-0.36*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.36*** 
-3.51 -3.56 -3.56 -3.56 
D2014 
-0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 
-1.43 -1.42 -1.42 -1.48 
D2015 
0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 
2.88 2.86 2.85 2.79 
D2016 
0.24*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 
2.68 2.75 2.75 2.69 
Intercept 
-5.61*** -4.51*** -4.34*** -4.46*** 
-10.18 -8.85 -8.52 -8.78 
Table 7 
 
 1 2 3 
ERR 
0 0 0 
1.07 1.23 0.93 
ROA 
 0 0 
 -1.92* -1.83* 
ROE 
 0 0 
 0.21 0.2 
SHF 
 0 0 
 2.06* 2.03* 
LNTA 
 0 0 
 0.09 0.02 
IBDEB 
 0 0 
 -2.01 -1.95 
D2015 
  0.00* 
  -2.13 
D2016 
  0 
  -0.65 
D2017 
  0.00* 
  -2.44 
Intercept 
0.00*** 0 0.01 
15.19 0.56 0.79 
Table 8 
